- Trevor Alexander Nestor
- May 11
- 5 min read
Stable societies need to separate social institutions from economic institutions to facilitate one-way flows of logic and information to enforce transactions and prop up the economy in the form of ciphers or cryptography. These ciphers also protect and silo information - often from the public. The current administration wants to invest heavily in cryptocurrency, and "make the United States the cryptocurrency capital of the world" as Donald Trump put it. This sounds good to some, but with advancements in quantum computers, could collapse the currencies, even with post-quantum cryptography developed by NIST (like lattice cryptography, which I've published an article on), some time in the 2030s. Not only does this risk collapsing cryptocurrency, but also central bank digital systems and cryptosystems which hold corporate, state, or individual secrets which hackers have been collecting for years awaiting Q-day - when quantum computing technology reaches a point of no return where they will be able to decrypt all of them, signaling institutional and societal collapse.
Every Bitcoin address corresponds to a public-private key pair on the secp256k1 curve. When you spend coins, you prove ownership by signing a transaction with your private key. ECDSA’s security rests on the hardness of the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), which classical computers find intractable for 256-bit curves. Bitcoin’s proof-of-work mining and block integrity hinge on SHA-256, a one-way hash function. Miners repeatedly hash block headers, searching for a result below a target threshold. The effort required scales exponentially, making it effectively impossible for attackers to reverse or shortcut with today’s hardware.
Modern analyses converge on 1,000–2,000 logical qubits running Shor’s algorithm to recover a 256-bit ECDSA private key within hours or days. At today’s anticipated error rates, that translates to millions of physical qubits once surface-code QEC is factored in. Industry and government projections suggest that by 2033–2037, quantum machines with enough logical qubits to crack Bitcoin addresses could materialize, turning digital gold into atomic dust. Even with more difficult SHA-256, there is evidence that physics might be exploited or leveraged to crack these ciphers.
Newer physics paradigms beyond the qubit circuit model are needed to crack "post-quantum" cryptography like lattice cryptography. I've discussed the route towards that in my paper "Theoretical Approaches to Solving the Shortest Vector Problem in NP-Hard Lattice-Based Cryptography with Post-SUSY Theories of Quantum Gravity in Polynomial Time by Orch-Or" in which I've argued that by weaving together ideas from quantum gravity, non-commutative geometry and post-supersymmetry physics, one can reimagine the classic NP-hard Shortest Vector Problem as a question about the spectrum of a Dirac-like operator defined on a spinfoam network. Rather than relying on brute-force search or conventional quantum circuits, the framework encodes each lattice point into a node of a spin-foam and uses topologically protected Majorana fermions - whose braiding and interaction with a dynamical, gravity-shaped geometry - in effect “loops” through this network (possibly by fermionic condensation towards a UV/IR fixed point described by the Monster CFT), homing in on the shortest vector via its smallest nonzero eigenvalue. By invoking the Spectral Action Principle, the paper shows how minimizing an action built from that operator’s spectrum both captures the lattice optimization and even hints at connections to the Riemann Hypothesis through a unitary mapping to the Hilbert–Pólya operator. Folded spectrum methods may be used to recover the solution eigenvalue from the exponential energy gap. Finally, there is possible experimental realization of this in biologically inspired hardware or within microtubule-based Orch-Or models of consciousness, suggesting a radical convergence of cryptography, quantum gravity and neuroscience.
Consider the secrets hidden today in corporate and state vaults: merger plans, product roadmaps, even defense-contract negotiations. Governments archive diplomatic cables and personal dossiers, hoping that encryption will keep them hidden indefinitely. Hackers already harvest encrypted data, stashing gigabytes in dark-web caches, awaiting the moment quantum gates flip and the world’s digital treasures are laid bare. Secrets of individuals - from bank account information to social media account access will be obtainable to any hacker with the right hardware. When Q-Day arrives - whether in 2033, 2037, or, in a moonshot scenario, as early as 2030 - the chaos will be unprecedented. Cryptocurrency markets will evaporate, CBDCs could vanish or be commandeered, and long-buried secrets will pour into the public sphere. Societies that have bound their economic engines to ciphers will find themselves disarmed, their once-trustworthy ledgers rendered lies by quantum deceit, and all institutions and societal structures dependent on digitization could collapse.
Cryptography has long underpinned modern society’s faith in digital transactions and private communications. By concentrating power in opaque algorithms and secret keys, we have sown the seeds of future upheaval. As the United States races to harness the promise of cryptocurrency, it must also reckon with a challenge that transcends the classical realm. Only by separating economic ambition from hubristic faith in the infallibility of any class of ciphers, and by prioritizing national restructuring and renewal can we transform the quantum tide from a harbinger of digital collapse into a force for renewed security. With the unprecedented investment in infrastructure needed to support cryptocurrency mining and transactions (the energy requirement to run an entire economy on cryptocurrency is enormous) there could be a silver lining in that after Q-day, all the infrastructure could be appropriated towards directly benefitting the public rather than simply to secure formal transactions.
Today’s leading proof-of-work cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, alone consumes more electricity each year than many medium-sized countries. Estimates from the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance put Bitcoin’s annual power draw at roughly 155–172 terawatt-hours (TWh) - comparable to the yearly consumption of Poland - while other assessments range from 87 TWh to over 175 TWh per year. By contrast, the entire United States grid supplies about 4,070 TWh annually, meaning Bitcoin today uses nearly 4 percent of U.S. electricity if it stood alone on the grid. Because Bitcoin’s energy cost is largely independent of transaction volume, each individual spend still carries the burden of securing the entire network. On average, one Bitcoin transaction “costs” roughly 1,279 kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity - enough to power an average U.S. home for six weeks - according to Digiconomist’s energy index.
Currently, Bitcoin’s on-chain activity remains vanishingly small compared to global payment volumes. As of May 2025, the Bitcoin network processes about 331 000 transactions per day, or roughly 121 million per year. By contrast, there were an estimated 724 billion credit-card transactions worldwide in 2023. That means Bitcoin transactions currently account for only about 0.017 percent of global credit-card payments - and if you include other bank transfers and noncard payments, the share is even lower, but with mass adoption at scale, could spell doom for the system as a whole. Elites know these limitations, and understand the issues that Q-day will bring - they are just hoping they can get as much as they can from it before the whole thing falls apart.